An argument which assumes that there is a first cause for an event and that first cause may be called God is considered a cosmological, or first-cause, argument. A simple version of such an argument states that:.
a) "Stuff" happens.
b) "Stuff" just doesn't happen by itself.
c) The "thing" that make "stuff" happen doesn't make itself happen.
d) There can't be an infinite number of "things" that can make "stuff" happen.
e) Therefore there must be an initial "thing" that makes "stuff" happen.
f) This initial "thing" we can call God.
Furthermore, this "stuff" that happens is referred to as being a "contingent". There are two definitions of contingent provided in the textbook, Peterson, et al. (1998): one defines a contingent being as a being which depends on other "things or circumstances other than itself" in order to exist (p. 67); the other defines it as a being that "though it exists, might not have existed" (p.97). Although there are two different definitions, both of these are connected because, a being that is considered contingent by one definition, will also be considered contingent under the other definition. The cosmological argument is broken down into two sections, the finistc first-cause argument and the infinitary first-cause argument. The finistc first-cause argument has a premise that states that there cannot be an infinite number of causes. There are some objections to this argument's statement that it is conceivable for there to be an infinite progression in causes thru time, but it is inconceivable for there to be an infinite regression of causes in time. The objection arises because it is, in fact, conceivable for there to be an infinite regression in time, just as it is conceivable for there to be an infinite number of positive and negative integers. The infinitary first cause argument allows there to be an infinite regression of causes in time but still states that there is a Necessary Being (God) that is responsible for all individual beings.