The analysis is flawed in general because it neglects to explain why smaller nations would join international regimes if they know that they will not receive as great of benefits as the larger, more powerful states. Constraint-choice analysis does a good job of backing up part of the author's argument. It shows why larger more powerful states are more inclined to join international regimes. .
Second point is the function of regimes and the context of which they operate. As pointed out in the section above, our world politic system is a "self-help" system. There is no higher power to go to for protection or help, so in turn systems of agreements must be made to keep the system in align. International regimes offer a playing ground for the actors in the international system to gain and benefit while still keeping order. There exist many levels of international regimes. Some levels control simply imports and exports and other levels control territory. For example, though, they intertwine. Lets say that a nation wants to import a larger number of textiles into another country but it requires two boats to bring in the load rather than one, the regime controlling imports and exports must first grant way and then the regime controlling territory, including sea territory, must grant passage. This is beneficiary to all parties because it allows for civilized bargaining for passage and imports rather than ugly monopolies and conflicts if it was completely left up to individuals. This is one of several contexts in which regimes are beneficial. .
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They offer a common ground for debate and agreement. This leads us to more general and overall beneficial uses of international regimes.
Third point that Mr. Keohane uses is by far the most important to his argument. In this section the uses and direct benefits of international regimes are discussed. There is, before we begin to break down this section, a few clarifications to be made.
