At a time of anticipation over the reform of our campaign system, the term limits experiment has much to tell us. I believe, based on a study done in California, that the implication of term limits had done this county good.
Term limits stimulate political competition. That is accomplished in a variety of ways, from increasing the number of open seats and special elections to lowering the reelection rates of incumbents. Many former incumbents return to private life, and a significant number run for other offices, thereby stimulating political competition at other levels. There is also evidence to suggest that campaigns may be less costly in a term-limited electoral environment. Under term limits, California's state campaign spending since 1992 is 44 percent lower than from 1984 to 1988.
Term limits increase legislative diversity. The idea of shorter political careers is also changing the people who choose to seek public office, encouraging political participation by nonprofessional politicians. Thus, the makeup of state legislatures is slowly moving away from the traditional ex-lawyer and ex-political aide. In California in 1995 there were only 3.4 percent self-described full-time state legislators, down from 36 percent in 1986. The powers that be are fond of saying that "high" turnover in 1992 demonstrates that term limits are unnecessary. The first error in that is the turnover rate of 25.3 percent was not high by historical standards. Only the exceptionally low turnover rates in the last two decades make it seem high. The second error is that turnover rates are always odd in years ending with a two. This is due to the ten-year cycle of partial incumbency. The Constitution requires a national census every ten years. So, the House has been reapportioned every ten years. Reapportionment causes incumbents to run against other incumbents. In five races in 1992, that virtually ensured five incumbents would win, and five would lose.