In order to have had a successful transfer of power from the mother country, France should not have used Syria as a tool in its rivalry with England. It appeared that France's main interest in Syria was as a display of its power and control over its colonies. If France had invested more interest in Syria as an addition to its empire, then its hold over the colony might have been stronger.
By the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was significantly weaker in Syria, allowing foreign forces to penetrate and form relationships with the different religious groups of Great Syria. France formed a significant bond with the Catholics and the British with the Protestants and the Druze. Despite this, Ottoman rule continued, though it was even further weakened due to the Arab independence movement. By the end of World War I the Ottoman Empire had collapsed, leading to an Arab administration in Damascus and the Syrian interior, French control of Palestine, and British control of the Syrian coastal areas. In 1915 Britain had assured Hussein, the leader of Mecca in the Arabian Penisula that independent Arab entities would be established in parts of the former Ottoman Empire. Despite this promise, it was revealed by Russia in 1917 that in 1916 there was a secret Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France that divided Greater Syria between the two. In addition, the 1917 Balfour Declaration promised British support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. In 1920 the San Remo Conference of the victorious allies placed Syria and Lebanon under French control. France believed that it was deserving of Syria based on a tradition dating back to the crusades, which was kept up by Francis I and Napoleon III. In Syria, France was the 2nd language and there were many enterprises in French hands such as the Joppa-Jerusalem railroad. England, however, wanted to keep France out to keep them away from the Suez Canal, a vital link in the defense of the empire.
