Held's definition is very similar to Valls", but Held adds that "creating fear is usually high among the intended effect." (Valls 565) It is important to note that under this definition, creating fear is not necessary for an act to be terrorism, but this seems to bring it more in line with ordinary language.
Under the provisions of just war theory, there are several criteria that a state must meet for the violence it initiates to be considered morally justifiable. Under jus ad bellum, the legitimate authority requirement has traditionally meant that only sovereign states may wage war. The reason for this is that private citizens do not need to resort to political violence because they have the state to protect their rights and interests and the state holds the monopoly on legitimate force to look out for the common good. Clearly not all states protect the rights and interests of their people. Some have been forcibly deprived of that right, as in cases of colonial and racist regimes and foreign occupation. If states are malevolent enough, then in principle, violence cannot be ruled out as a necessary means of ending injustice. The UN general assembly endorsed such actions in its denunciation of terrorism in 1987. Valls asserts that some nonstate organizations present a plausible claim to be a people's representative. Therefore some nonstate actors may justifiably use violence for political reasons.
Under jus in bello, there are two categories, one being discrimination. This requires that those waging war distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets. This has usually been interpreted as meaning making the distinction between combatants and noncombatants. It can be argued that not all civilians in a population are truly innocent concerning the policies and actions of their governments, except maybe children. It is also difficult to describe what exactly innocence is.
