This salary cap, or some version of it, would serve to protect owners from losses incurred as a result of bidding wars for superstar players. It would have the additional benefit of providing funds for investment in fledgling teams like the Florida Marlins or teams that are at an obvious financial disadvantage because of the size and location of their market. This is "good for baseball," the owners insist, and will help keep the playing field even by allowing poorer teams to acquire some of the most competitive players. It all sounds fairly reasonable. .
But the players' wily labor chief, Donald Fehr, cries "Foul ball!" and scoffs regularly at the owners' attempt to disregard antitrust laws and usurp control of free-agent labor. The current system gives players the right to auction their batting and fielding wizardry to the highest bidder after six years in the majors. In the initial meetings at the Hotel Intercontinental in New York City, the owners' mouthpiece, Mr. Ravitch, attempted to justify a salary cap by noting that 19 of 28 professional clubs "lost" money according to last year's accounting books. Mr. Fehr and the players' union hired Stanford University economist Roger Noll to analyze the owners' financial information. Mr. Noll's observations revealed that the number of teams that actually lost money could likely be counted on one hand and that the discrepancy between his figures and those of the owners can be attributed to creative accounting of the legal but misleading kind. Mr. Fehr, refraining up to this point fr!.
om discussing the microeconomics of baseball, has consistently tagged the owners' arguments as baseless prevarication and rejected their proposal solely on the basis of economic and legal principle. .
The owners may in fact be reaping the bitter harvest of their fickle past. .
While many resent the owners' cry for help, few lament the circumstances of the players, who are 750 of the highest paid entertainers (and the highest paid professional athletes).
