At one point Sparta actually calls in Persia, its own enemy in the battle against Athens. Had the unpredictability of war not brought about the plague of Athens and later the revolt of her allies, this vast difference in degrees of unification would have plagued Sparta much more persistently throughout the war. This theme of unification in conflict against a divided power can also be seen in Napoleon's unified France against a coalition formed from the jumble of powers that was Europe. After emerging from an ugly internal struggle for power, France then became one of the most clearly unified and motivated powers that modern military history had seen. The use of levee en masse then added unprecedented efficiency at a time when manpower was very much analogous to military power. The coalitions, on the other hand, were divided not only politically, but also in motives and degree of determination. Politically, what is now Germany was divided into roughly 30 states, Austria had yet to become a state, and often had divided high commands. Italy was divided, and Russia lacked a unified decision making process. The king of Prussia was swayed by French bribes, and the remaining powers were often skeptical to oppose the power of Napoleon such that Britain was the only force stubborn enough to never accept peace with France. In 1806, after the bulk of the coalition had been defeated at Austerlitz Prussia actually tried to fight France alone, meanwhile Russia was at war with Turkey (although Russia later joined to form the fourth coalition, along with Sweden and Britain). Such divisions of foc!.
us and high command led to horrible unforeseen weaknesses in the robustness of the coalitions theories of victory. Miscalculations of arrival times of forces, divisions of command, and unshared motivations were thematic problems for the coalitions. .
A second analogy that follows from the Peloponnesian to the Napoleonic wars is that of Athens and Britain as sea powers vs.
