Often times the insider is the company manager; other times it is the company's lawyer, investment banker, or even the printer of the company's financial statement. Anyone who has knowledge before public dissemination of that information stands to benefit from good news or bad news, which can often make stock-trading profits by using the information to guide decisions relating to the purchase or sale of corporate securities. "The primary constraint on firms' ability to permit their insiders to trade on the basis of the nonpublic information they obtain in the course of the employment is rule 10b-5, which is the SEC's principal weapon against insider trading. The SEC's auth!.
ority to enact rule 10b-5 is based on 10(b) of the 1934 act, a broad provision that authorizes the SEC to prohibit "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance- (Cross & Miller 381). In other words, federal securities laws do not expressly prohibit insider trading, the crime of insider trading was not defined in any statutes or rules administered by the SEC, and federal securities laws provide only one specific remedy for insider trading: an injunction against future violations. The SEC preferred the days when the law of insider trading was vague. .
Some people believe that insider trading should be permitted. One reasons is, if insider trading is best viewed from a property rights perspective, some firms will probably allocate those rights to corporate insiders to reduce insiders' demands for fixed wages at little or no cost to outside shareholders. Additional reasons for permitting insiders to trade exist as well. Not all firms will find these benefits compelling. Rather, given immense variety of firms and the diversity of tastes and preferences among managers and shareholders, a blanket prohibition on trading by insiders is unlikely to be advantageous to all firms. Firms that wish to prohibit insider trading can do so by private negotiation with their managers.