This stratification of society, and unequal distribution of power is simply an extension of Plato's system of justice. In the Platonic world there are those who are born to farm and those who are " by nature good at remembering, quick to learn, high-minded, graceful, and a friend and relative of truth, justice, courage, and moderation- (Plato 161), and thus fit to rule. .
Plato's political system is not concerned with promoting liberty and equal distribution of power. " [I]t isn't the laws concern to make any one class in the city outstandingly happy but to contrive to spread happiness throughout the city by bringing citizens into harmony with each other - (Plato 191-192). Rather, Plato finds it necessary to place absolute power in the hands of a select group, who by fact of nature and education posses extreme virtue and reason, and will promote moderation and harmony for the republic as a whole.
Moderation is surely a kind of order, the mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires in the soul of that very person, there is a better part and a worse one and that whenever the naturally better part is in control of the worse, this is expressed by saying that the person is self-controlled But when, on the other hand, the smaller and better part is overpowered by the larger this is called being self-defeated or licentious Take a look at our new city You'll say that it is rightly called self-controlled, if indeed something in which the better rules the worse is properly called moderate and self-controlled Now, one finds all kinds of diverse desires in those of the inferior majority who are called free But you meet with the desires that are simple, measured, and directed by calculation in accordance with understanding and correct belief only in the few people who are born with the best natures and receive the best education Then, don't you see that in you city, too, the desires of the inferior many are controlled by the wisdom and desires of the superior few Therefore, if any city is said to be in control of itself and of its pleasures and desires, it is this one And isn't it, therefore, also moderate because of all this (Plato 106-107).
