On frequent occasions since the decline of Spain as Europe's principal power, that country has become a thorn in the side of the two other great powers on the Atlantic, France and Britain: Napoleon described the Peninsular War as his "greatest mistake" and the Quadruple Alliance of the 1830's saw Spanish difficulties shatter the Anglo-French entente. Indeed, France's greatest military humiliation in 1870 was provoked by a dispute with Prussia over Spanish succession. Little wonder then that in August 1936 both France and Britain sought a haven in a policy of non-intervention when the Officers rebellion in Spain became a civil war. .
`Anglo-French non-intervention ultimately proved little more than a confession of weakness which left Spain with a Fascist dictatorship for nearly forty years, but the reasons for the policy, which most countries agreed to but only a handful adhered to, were more complex than a purely historical reaction to the Spanish problem. In practice, French policy was to mirror British policy in many ways but the rationale and the goals of the two allies were rather different. Much controversy surrounds whether Leon Blum was bullied into the policy of non-intervention or not; I am unable to contribute further to that debate but in the absence of firm evidence either way we are best placed to take an objective stance and examine the concerns and interests of each country. The French and British Governments were influenced by presumptions, estimates and prejudices which were not always accurate but, in Foreign Policy, perception is often more important than reality. It is necessary therefore to look in turn at each country and examine how the leaders and diplomats perceived their respective interests and how they assessed and claimed those interests were most likely to be promoted or threatened.
`British Foreign Policy in the 1930's is often summed up by one word: appeasement.
