Because all of which I need to maintain my identity is my memories, I have no problem taking the transporter. My memories will be completely unharmed and remain with me.
Perry next uses the character Weirob to argue against the Memory Theory. Weirob would argue against the conclusion by saying that a preservation of memories does not lead to a preservation of self. She would say that I hadn't survived and that the person on Earth was someone who only seemed to remember my experiences. Since the new being on Earth had not actually been there to receive the memories, it actually isn't me. I would thus not be around to anticipate the later experiences. She would bring up the example of heavenly bodies. If God creates a heavenly body with certain memories, God can certainly create two. If these two bodies have the same exact memories, then, according to the Memory Theory, they must have the same identity. This is, of course, absurd because identity implies oneness. Since the Memory Theory is shown to be absurd, so is the idea that I will survive merely because my memories survived.
The first part of Weirob's argument is appealing to me because it shows that the person who arrived on Earth didn't actually have the experiences that I did. The person merely seemed to have the memories. The next part is not nearly as appetizing. I don't buy this argument because, in my opinion, it is somewhat of a copout. It seems as though whenever Weirob confronts an identity theory, she refutes it by bringing up a hypothetical situation in which there are two beings with the same factor (whatever the theory is suggesting as the source of identity). The argument is merely bringing up a case that can deny any identity theory. For example, when she confronts the Brain Theory, she refutes it by bringing up a situation when two identical brains are constructed.
If faced with the decision of transporting herself to Earth or dying on Mars, principally I would think that Weirob would die on Mars.
