and that he would be advised of their position "in the near future". No reply.
ever came and on the eve of the conference the British were unaware of U.S.
refugee policy4, a practice that would recur throughout the refugee crisis.
Assistant Secretary of State George Messersmith, in briefing the President's.
Advisory Committee on Political Refugees (PACPR) before Evian, expressed the U.S.
desire to "create some permanent apparatus to deal with the refugee problem,".
but they, "envisioned no plan of official assistance to refugees."5 Taylor.
expressed this policy in his opening speech at Evian in saying that the U.S.
would accept 27,000 refugees as outlined in the German and Austrian quotas, no.
more. The only concrete achievement of the conference was the creation of the.
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), which was to be a voluntary.
organization, totally dependent on private funding. Furthermore, no member of.
the IGCR would be expected to change immigration policies and quotas. The.
obvious lack of intended action was summed up in the final communiqué of the.
conference, "The governments of the countries of refuge and settlement should.
not assume any obligations for the financing of involuntary emigration."6 The.
conference concluded and Taylor, weary of the fact that nothing had been.
accomplished in the week at Evian, cabled the State Department warning that if.
the United States does not move to act, "other countries of settlement will.
claim that they are not obligated to commit themselves."7 Secretary Hull cabled.
back reminding Taylor of the rigid immigration laws and the restrictionist.
sentiment in Congress. The unwillingness of the U.S. to set the example,.
allowed for the attending nations to keep their borders closed, hiding behind.
domestic unemployment, anti-Semitism and, American apathy.
So, before war broke out in September 1939, during that same.
summer, President Roosevelt called for the deactivation of the IGCR, the now.
