For example, I cannot feel excluded if I don't construe myself as excluded. Roberts gives the example of the duck-rabbit picture. Seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck does not indicate that the person knows, it can be a duck, nor will the person judge the picture to be seen like that. The person only construes the picture as a duck. .
But, construing a feature to myself is not adequate to really feel this feature. For example, to feel excluded must imply that I averse being excluded. So, a construed feeling is an intentional feeling (because it is about/of/etc. something) and it is based in a concern. Only these feelings of construed condition can be allocated to emotions.
Another widespread idea is that emotions are some kind of "evaluative judgment". For example, I left my bike outside and am afraid it will go rusty because of a weather forecast that says, it will rain during the night. From this, one can derive that I judge my bike to be endangered by rain. So, my judgment complies with my emotion. Roberts enumerates three arguments against this kind of relation between emotions and judgments. The first one, just to make clear that in Roberts opinion, emotions can also not be equated with judgments, states that sometimes the proposition that would be confirmed in the judgment according to our emotion is disbelieved. Bike-example: I might make the opposite judgment because I try not to believe in the weather forecast for the following night although it stays in the back of my head. In this case (and many others) emotion seems to be irrational, but a mental state is nothing less than an emotion for being irrational. So, the equation of emotions and judgments has failed as well.
Now, incorporating all facts, Roberts characterizes what a construal is and finally what he understands as "concern-based construals". .
Construals are mental states or events in which certain things are represented with regard to something else.