The new government has a choice. Either it can maintain the predominantly inactive stance of previous Conservative Administrations, or it can attempt through example, innovation and political leverage to bring fresh energy and movement to the international agenda. .
Secondly, the civil reprocessing programme in which Britain has invested so heavily since the 1950s is in serious difficulty. Recent events at home and abroad mean that the THORP reprocessing plant may only operate at low levels of throughput, if at all; and the reprocessing of Magnox fuels is likely to cease within the next ten to fifteen years as the ageing Magnox reactors are closed down. So the end of reprocessing in Britain is probably in sight. However, this prospect has yet to be reflected in any shift in policy: the previous government continued to proclaim the benefits, and necessities, of reprocessing. Painful though the changes may be, policies on spent fuel management need to be reassessed both internally and externally in co-operation with foreign customers. .
Thirdly, Britain faces a substantial disposal task, of two kinds. One is the decommissioning of facilities, including reprocessing plants at Sellafield and Dounreay and elderly processing facilities at Aldermaston and Burghfield (where nuclear warheads and components have been fabricated). The other task is the disposition of excess fissile material, including the large stockpile (nearly 50 tonnes) of reactor-grade plutonium that is held in store at Sellafield. The first of these tasks has begun to be addressed, the second has not. .
Three particular challenges lie ahead: .
To submit Britain's military stocks, infrastructures and practices to greater international verification. Transparency and verification would initially apply around the edges of the military domain, but as further restrictions are placed on the acquisition, deployment and usage of nuclear arms through bilateral and multilateral agreements, would become more extensive.
