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The future of civil reprocessing in Britain; whether its planned expansion can be justified in view of the loss of market demand for plutonium, the chaotic state of Britain's nuclear waste disposal policies, and the difficulties of returning plutonium and waste products to foreign customers; and if reprocessing is not justified, whether a consensus can be formed domestically and with foreign governments and utilities around long-term storage of the spent fuels that have already been delivered to Sellafield. .
The disposition of surplus fissile materials: how much material in military stocks is now excess to defence requirements; and whether, how and when a major programme should be launched to dispose of the large stocks of separated plutonium, and of spent submarine fuels, that are currently held in store at Sellafield. .
1. Introduction .
Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are the essential 'fissile materials' used in nuclear weapons. Since 1945, about 3000 tonnes of these materials have been produced world-wide, of which some 2000 tonnes (1760 tonnes of HEU and 230 tonnes of plutonium) have been produced for military purposes and 1000 tonnes (almost entirely plutonium) have arisen within the civilian fuel-cycle. 1 The regulation of fissile materials now occupies a central place in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation policy. Furthermore, any act of nuclear disarmament, as events in Iraq and South Africa have recently shown, must entail the appropriate verification of all fissile materials acquired by the country in question. To be plausible, a project of global disarmament would therefore hinge upon the ability and willingness of all nation states to reveal their material inventories, submit them and associated production facilities to rigorous international verification, and dispose of residual stocks. .
Next to the US and former Soviet Union, and along with France, Britain has been the most important player in the global politics and economics of fissile materials.
