To Madison, there are only two ways to control a faction. First is to remove the causes and the second to control the effects. The first is impossible because the two ways to remove the causes of a faction: destroy liberty or give every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests. Destroying liberty is a "cure worse then the disease itself," and the second is impracticable. The causes of factions are thus part of the nature of man and we must deal with their effects and accept their existence. The government created by the Constitution controls the damage caused by such factions. .
The framers established a representative form of government in which the many elect the few who govern. Pure or direct democracies cannot possibly control factious conflicts because the strongest and largest faction dominates, and there is no way to protect weak factions against the actions of an obnoxious individual or a strong majority. Direct democracies cannot effectively protect personal and property rights and have always had conflict. In the representative democracy, Madison hopes that the men elected to office will be wise and good men. Theoretically, those who govern should be the least likely to sacrifice the public good, but the opposite might happen. Men, by intrigue or corruption, to win elections and then betray the interests of the people, might sacrifice the public good. However, the possibility of this happening in a large country is greatly reduced. The likelihood that public office will be held by qualified men is greater in large countries because there will be more representative chosen by a greater number of citizens. This makes it more difficult for the candidates to deceive the people. Representative government is needed in large countries, not to protect the people from the tyranny of the few, but to guard against the rule of the mob. In large republics, factions will be many, but will be weaker than in small and/or direct democracies where consolidation is easy.
