This "de-Stalinization- process as he called it replaced Stalinist Polish and Hungarian leaders with Communist party figures who could run the country. The process also helped the Soviet Union financially because the Soviet Union bore most of the cost of the Warsaw Pact (United States Foreign Policy, 219). This change in the Warsaw Pact caused Albania, in 1962, to stop participating in the Warsaw Pacts actions, and finally in 1968, Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact entirely (Appendix C: The Warsaw Pact, online).
In October 1956, the Polish government had trouble handling the workers' riots. This showed weakness and fear of an uprising to the Soviets. But the Polish leader, Waldyslaw Gomulka, made it clear that if any country tried to intervene in their domestic problems, it would be a violation of the Warsaw Pact and they would meet Polish forces. This situation caused the Soviet Union to redefine the standards for its allies. They made it a requirement that countries must remain in the Warsaw Pact and uphold the leading role of the communist party (Appendix C: The Warsaw Pact, online).
Another incident occurred in late October, in Hungary, which called for different actions by the Soviet Unions army. Imre Nagy, the leader of the Communist party in Hungary, withdrew his nation from the Warsaw Pact and ended its alliance with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was unhappy with these terms and invaded Hungary with 200,000 troops. This action diminished the revolution and left 25,000 Hungarians dead. The Soviets forced Hungary to sign a status-of-force agreement letting Soviet military presence be permanent. The problems in Poland and Hungary caused the Soviets to reevaluate their Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries. Khrushchev justified his actions in Hungary by saying they involved the terms of the Warsaw Pact, but it was only the Soviets who attacked, no other Warsaw Pact countries aided in the invasion.
