that they could deliver the goods. .
(23) .
This movement "from virtue to competence" seemed to mark a .
serious departure from orthodox Chinese political theory. Confucius .
himself had posited in the fifth century BCE that those individuals who .
best demonstrated what he referred to as moral force should lead the .
nation. Using this principle as a guide, China had for centuries attempted .
to choose at least its bureaucratic leaders by administering a test to .
determine their moral force. After the Communist takeover of the country, .
Mao continued this emphasis on moral force by demanding that Chinese .
citizens demonstrate what he referred to as "correct consciousness." This .
correct consciousness could be exhibited, Mao believed, by the way people .
lived. Needless to say, that which constituted correct consciousness was .
often determined and assessed by Mao. Nevertheless, the ideal of moral .
force was still a potent one in China even after the Communist takeover. .
It is noteworthy that Shirk feels that the Chinese Communist .
Party leaders saw economic reform as a way to regain their and their .
party's moral virtue even after Mao's death. Thus, paradoxically, by .
demonstrating their expertise in a more practical area of competence, the .
leaders of the CCP felt they could demonstrate how they were serving the .
people. To be sure, the move toward economic reform came about as a result .
of a "changed domestic and international environment, which altered the .
leadership's perception of the factors that affect China's national .
security and social stability" (Xu 247). But Shirk feels that, in those .
pre-Tienenmen days, such a move came about also as a result of an attempt .
by CCP leaders to demonstrate, in a more practical and thus less obviously .
ideological manner than Mao had done, their moral force. .
This is not to say that the idea of economic reform was .
embraced enthusiastically by all members of the leadership of the Chinese .
