I got a student using one of these papers by using google. Many philosophers have argued, and rightly so, that acts such as those that betray, destroy one's reputation, or undermine one's achievements can harm a person even if they never affect her experiences. For instance, it seems that the slandering of my reputation can be harmful to me even if I never become aware of it, even if I never experience any change in how others act around me, even if I never feel any less respected as a result of the defamation. The reason is that I care not only about feeling respected, but also about being respected. Now some philosophers go a step further and argue that since I desire to be respected not only while alive but also after my death, the slandering of my reputation can be harmful to me even if it occurs after my death. For if it isn't necessary that I learn of the slander or experience any ill effects as result of it, then why do I need to be alive at the time the slander occurs in order for it to constitute a harm for me? All that my death does is make it all the more certain that I will never be experientially affected by the slander. But if this is not a necessary condition for the slander being harmful to me, then we can conclude that death makes no difference. Or so some philosophers have argued.
But the conclusion doesn't follow; for there may be some other necessary condition for being harmed that the dead fail to meet. For instance, it may be that the non-fulfillment of a desire constitutes a harm only if the person still has that desire "perhaps, past desires don't count. And those who are dead fail to meet this condition just as much as those who have changed their mind and no longer care about the object of their past desire do. .
Generally, we don't think that when deciding what is best for oneself one needs to consider one's past desires. For consider the following example.