There was a radio message that announced Japanese war intentions on December 6, it was intercepted in Hawaii but never delivered to Kimmel. American radio monitors linked two carrier divisions with the Japanese battle force headed for Southeast Asia. There were six heavy flattops of Carrier Divisions One, Two, and Five on their way to Pearl Harbor. This is powerful evidence of American foreknowledge of the event. Stinnet feels that Roosevelt knew that the Pacific fleet would be in harms way. Roosevelt never informed Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short of a possible attack by Japan. .
I agree with what Stinnet had to say about the attack on Pearl Harbor. Stinnet feels strongly about this subject and he wrote about a lot of the actual evidence that links Roosevelt to having knowledge of the possible attack. Stinnet touches a lot on the whole decoding situation. He writes that the messages did say that Japan was going to attack. I think that Roosevelt knew and for some reason he did not warn Short or Kimmel about it. .
Researcher and historian John Toland wrote about how Roosevelt and others knew about Japan's attack before it happened, and that they had deprived Kimmel and Short of important messages since the summer. Many believe that General George C. Marshall was afraid that the Japanese would discover that the US had solved their purple code. Although they suspected that Japan would attack, Marshall and Admiral Harold R. Stark pressured Roosevelt to respond calmly. The Secretary of War, Henry Stimson and The Secretary of The Interior, Harold Ickes urged the president to take action against Japan. Washington received many reports that the missing Kido Butai was heading east toward Hawaii. There were warnings from the twelfth Naval District and from General Ter Poorten and Brigadier General Elliot Thorpe.
By December 4 Roosevelt and a small group of advisors, including Secretary of the navy Frank Knox, Stimson, and Marshall, were faced with three options.
