Ethical language is something that has been debated for many years and has been discussed as both non-cognitive and cognitive. The cognitive view, that when we are talking about morality we are talking about facts, is one that is often put to question as it is a difficult belief to accept. For example, how can we be as certain about goodness, truth or justice, as we are about say the colour of a wall? Where does this knowledge come from?.
The non-cognitive view, that moral statements are not propositions available to knowledge, is, in my opinion easier to believe. This is based firstly on the difficulty many people have with simply accepting that the truth or falsity of a moral statement is through pre-conceived knowledge. This idea is similar to Plato's theory of forms. The theory that we are born with an acknowledgement of a perfect form, "goodness". .
It is possible to consider moral statements are actually factual, however, justifying our understanding simply by suggesting knowledge is difficult to believe. Similar to Plato's realm of forms which gives us the same pre-conceived recollection of the essence of goodness. It is a far-fetched idea, that a human could instinctively know whether something is true or false, right or wrong. We need evidence.
Ethical naturalism is the belief that we can establish moral facts using evidence in the same way scientists establish scientific facts. For example if we look at the consequences of stealing and murder then we see that it leads to unhappiness which suggests it is wrong.
Are we then confusing happiness with goodness? G.E Moore argues that Ethical Naturalism makes a mistake as we cannot simply verify moral statements by looking at evidence available to the 5 senses, mistake "Naturalistic Fallacy". Goodness resists definition. .
Moore understood however that it is important to make some moral statements, and that this can be done by defining what things are good.
