Party politics had, after a two-decade struggle, finally become a weight in government, but not without compromise. The lower, elected house of the Diet was given less power than that of the House of Peers, to which membership was hereditary or gifted by imperial will, and this upper house managed to block initiatives from the elected body on several occasions2. Another official counterweight to any executive power the lower house may have had was the Privy Council, a highly powerful advisory board to the emperor. It too was staffed by wealthy conservatives, such as Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo, and was mostly opposed to any legislation that tried to extend democratic rights too far3. As well as these official barriers to the role of the Diet's lower house, there also existed the informal Genro, a small cadre of elder statesmen whose role was also to advise the emperor on political matters. One example of their power is that the Prime Minister of the House of Representatives was essentially picked by the Genro, and they made sure that the will of nonparty elites was not trodden on by the actions of the elected parties.4 As the parliament's 'position still depended on the Genro and House of Peers', there could be no 'constitutional adventures'5. .
As well as civilian obstacles to the effectiveness of the elected parliament, there was also the fact that the military had no obligation or accountability to it. The Meiji Constitution dictated that the military answer only to the emperor, and so any issue concerning military action was out of the hands of the lower house. Finally, the role of the emperor himself as the ultimate source of Japanese authority meant that any action on the part of government could be overruled by recourse to an imperial prerogative. As present in the opinion of some Japanese scholarship, 'the sound and fury of the party battle could never be more than diversionary in the broad sweep of an absolutism built on Emperor, land, and capital.