On the 22nd of June 1941 Germany invaded Russia, an invasion named: Operation Barbarossa. This was an attack which continued until January 1044, when after 900 days Germany's plan to defeat Russia failed. There are various different theories to explain Germany's defeat yet it is clear that Germany was defeated because of their poor planning and inferior tactics.
Mistake 1.
Splitting the Army into Two Divisions .
Hitler was assertive that the German army would defeat the Soviet army, he was sure that his army could match the size of the Red Army and that the Germans were much better equipped. Hitler's confidence was Germany's first mistake; he split up their army, resulting in Germany fighting on two different fronts. The problem with splitting up their army is that although Hitler believed that their army was superior to the Red Army, he had fewer men to fight which makes this also Hitler's most crucial mistake. .
Mistake 2.
Dividing the Army into Three Divisions .
Hitler had three main objectives within Russia, his plan was to split up his army in three different sections; Army Group North was to take Leningrad, Army Group Centre would seize Russia's capital, Moscow and Army Group South would move on to Ukraine. This way Germany could take over the Soviet factories quickly, however Stalin decided to move 80 percent of Russia's industrial factories to the east to protect them from the fighting which enabled the Soviets to continue fighting as these factories supplied new equipment. Also by dividing the army again Germany had a strong disadvantage to the Soviet troops which restricted the Germans to defeat the Soviet troops. .
The Germans had lots of victories they seized three million of Soviet troops by the end of 1941 but as the Soviets retreated they 'scorched the earth' burning everything that could be useful resources for the Germans. Hitler believed that the French attack in 1812 failed because of this technique, the French has gone too deep into Russian terrain which disabled them to get enough supplies in.
