Virginia and North Carolina militia ended up facing the best troops under his command, and after about three-quarters of an hour, they broke through the American front lines, circled behind the Continental Army regulars, and finished the engagement with cavalry. British losses were just over 300, and they killed or captured more than a thousand of Gates' troops. .
At the height of Cornwallis' campaign in the south, he had nearly three-fifths of the British Army under his command. The southern strategy had become the focus of British political leadership as well. The southern states were the most populated, they had alliances with the Creek and Cherokee Indians, and the British assumed they could recruit reinforcements from loyalists and the slave population. While Cornwallis pursued the preferred strategy of the government, Clinton balked and favored one centering on New York. Clinton pursued a strategy of being on the defensive, while Cornwallis took the offensive along with a strategy of southern pacification. Cornwallis agreed with George III and Lord Germain for bold, decisive moves and rapidity. After the capture of Charleston, this is exactly what Cornwallis did. .
Only irregular forces and militia gave opposition to Cornwallis because he had defeated most of the southern units of the Continental Army. General Nathaniel Greene and General Daniel Morgan did much to revive the Continental Army, but it remained outnumbered by the British under Cornwallis. Cornwallis was determined to build on his victory at Camden, and decided to march into North Carolina. He counted on Loyalist support, but was to be disappointed in that regard, which destabilized British strategy. The bloody defeat of a loyalist brigade, under the command of Major Patrick Ferguson, at King's Mountain on the border between North and South Carolina, destroyed their ability to recruit loyalists into service. This left outposts and supply lines vulnerable, forcing Cornwallis to return to South Carolina for the winter.
