There seems to be a reoccurring argument that both educated thinkers and philosophers ponder. This argument known as the Argument for the problem of external world explores that ones thought is controlled by some sort of evil genius/demon or by a computer. I believe this to be false.
The question, "how do you know you aren't being systematically deceived by an evil genius? " appears simpler then expected. First off it is very understandable why this argument about the problem of the external world can persuade various people to think or believe they are not in full control of them selves. Descartes made a valid point when he discussed this problem. He stated, "I think, therefore, I am ", meaning in further detail, it is merely impossible to make me think that I exist when I do not exist. If I do not exist then I cannot think. This ultimately means that there couldn't be an evil genius controlling what I do because it would be impossible to not exist and think at the same time, according to Descartes.
After further thinking and reflecting on Descartes' argument, it becomes clear to me as to why this argument is unsound. This argument is actually unreasonable in more than the whole concept of thinking and not existing. My whole belief on this argument being challenged is based upon emotions and feelings. This explains why the statement, "it is possible that our sensory experiences are caused by something other than the objects of experience themselves " is unsound. My thought on this whole process is that the way we feel both emotionally and physically, the way we want and need, cannot be controlled by one evil genius. .
If the whole process of one evil genius controlling everyone's minds is thought about, something must be questioned. If there were one evil genius controlling everyone's minds at one time, wouldn't that mean we would all be thinking the same thing? How about if the evil genius controls our emotions? Bringing psychology into this, everyone has their own individual thought as to what something feels like.
