In judging whether the EU's structural/cohesion funds have worked and avoided significant stress, we must look at the enduring indoctrination period that has prolonged from 2007 to 2013. The achievement of EU transmits in accomplishing convergence is no trifling matter. Poor regions that are undergoing a catch-up stage may grow at a faster rate than richer regions, rather autonomously from the acceptance of transfers (Becker, 2012 pp. 6-7). This means, that the straightforward comparison regarding the growth rates of regions that obtain transfers and those that don't is inadequate to draw any satisfying conclusions. The European Commission strives to relieve any worries that capital is being spent in an unsuitable manner by handling the issue by meticulously clarifying projects that have been accepted to receive funding. .
But the key issue from a financial viewpoint is whether these structural funds prove a beneficial return in terms of enhanced growth that praises the sum spent on the regional policy in the first place. This matter has been examined in a several different ways. Sala-i-Martin evaluated the regional development trends in the EU in comparison with other coalitions that are short of a similarly widespread cohesion programme indicated that EU's structural/cohesion policy was a letdown, but nevertheless his conclusion required the contrast of coalitions and their regions in all further statistics, which is empirically non-marginal. Simply put, not all regions are uniformly efficient at applying Objective 1 transfers into additional growth and benefit of their country (Sala-i-Martin, 2002, pp. 1325–1330). Giving unrestricted transfers to regions where education standards of the labour force is below average, or the government is afflicted with corruption, is just unproductive and results in wasted use of limited funding. This has been seen in countries such as .
