It was envisaged in the early 2000's that in the next decade, the first Central and East European Countries (CEECs) would almost certainly press in joining the European Union. This entails that the EU's strategy of structural support for these regions that are dealing with economic complexities and transactions will have to be taken up for the new member states. Since all potential new member states will, perhaps in not all aspects, be distinctly more disadvantaged in the time and process of appointment, there is no telling on how they could resort to utilising the EU's support. Most .
significantly of all, they will all become eligible for the most rigorous measure of structural assistance and funding, which will result in increase of EU expenditures considerably. In the perception of many onlookers, the Union's stress in tackling structural/cohesion funds for these EEC countries is one of the crucial obstacles of its enlargement.
Even though economic assimilation within the EU has made acknowledgeable steps forward during the 1990's, in our times of dwindling national budgets and rising deficits, many governments sternly believe that further distension must be resisted in the EU finances. Putting this into perspective, we must ask to what amount have these expenditures achieved their objectives, taking into account that the EU can spend up to €130 billion per year, which is equal to approximately 1% of the gross national income of its 27 constituent states alone. There have been requests by many, particularly in the UK, to hold back fiscal influence from Brussels, which would allow the budgetary resolutions to .
return back to the hands of the member states (Becker, 2012 pp. 4-6). One of the EU's chief spending items is centred on structural or cohesion policy. The reason that this regional focus is so important is because there are still substantial variations in GDP per capita not just across states but transversely regions within these states such as the EECs.
