As Yasheng Huang has noted, China's political economy is highly centralized [1]. As the principle, the party delegates its authority to the government, but it still holds the appointment and removal power of ministry and provincial leaders. Thus, the center actually has strong control over local government and the overall policy making process. The government bureaucracy is also organized hierarchically, meaning that official bureaucratic rank is important in the bargaining process [2]. The formal rank of the implementing bureau will highly affect the effectiveness of the policy. The failure of policy coordination with different economic agencies for WTO membership in the early round best illustrates the effect of ranking. As a temporary committee, MoFTEC, the chief negotiating body on WTO, finds itself unable to coordinate with other agencies that have a higher rank. Therefore, from this organizational structure, it is easy to conclude that the economic policy making process is still top-down [3].
Another important characteristic within the economic policy making process is fragmented authority. This term, as defined by Andrew Mertha in his paper, means that the center's policy will change towards political goals of vertical agencies and regions [4]. In China, the CCP encourages ministers to articulate the interests of their particular sector. These intentionally designed bureaucratic career incentives also reinforce organizational allegiances. Thus, ministries will bargain from their viewpoints and in favor of their specific interests. This bargaining occurs both vertically and horizontally. Vertically in the sense that bureaus bargain with the center and horizontally because bureaus bargain with other bureaus at the same level. Since bureaus at the same level have equal veto power, there are many veto gates. .
In addition, under a reciprocal accountability system in China, the center needs the support of ministers and local government.
