17th century England and France shall serve as concrete examples, historically framing the paradox of constitutional persistence in a territorial context. Based on concepts derived from the idea of institutional design, territorially aligned estates who are electorally based are more likely to draw external support, show increased resistance to bribes and threats from territorial rulers, and as a result, persist most than estates who lack these inherent qualities. .
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Before further analyzing the paradox of constitutional persistence in regards to territorial rulers and estates, it is of utmost importance to gain a proper understanding of the Medieval Constitution alongside it's respective components. The Medieval Constitution consists of cooperation between hegemonic territorial rulers and estates (who act as consultative assemblies) in consultation over critical topics such as taxes, war, and religious order. Although it seems a body of individuals who voice opinions on the aforementioned topics would be essential to the proper functioning of the territory in regards to the prevention of corruption on behalf of the territorial ruler or consideration of the of the interests of the people, it often leads to deadlock. The state-building process as a whole generates repeated conflict with deadlock between the territorial ruler and the estates over issues such as laws regarding state power, taxes, war and peace, religious order, and the question of who will eventually control the state. Out of the political deadlock stemming from state-building process, we see the emergence of new and unique forms of institutional powers. It is here where we see either the subordination and disappearance of the estates, or the persistence of estates with regards to the Medieval Constitution. It is our goal to properly explain this paradox and the imperative reasons behind the varied results we see through history, most notably in 17th century England and France.
