There was, however, a tenuous historical case that Kuwait belonged to Iraq and this provided a veneer of legitimacy to Hussein's invasion.
John Simpson noted a famous statement by Tam Dalyell that "if Kuwait had been famous for its carrots, the US would not have lifted its proverbial finger." While this may be true, it is unlikely that Saddam Hussein would have pushed his territorial claims so far in pursuit of that crop. Iraq in 1990 was economically ravaged by war with Iran and over $80bn in debt. Recent Kuwaiti oil production had exceeded OPEC production quotas. This surfeit of oil had depressed oil prices from $22 per barrel in January to $13 per barrel in the spring of 1990, leading to a reduction in revenue for Iraq from her own oil sales. As Iraq, unlike Kuwait, was so dependent on oil this led to real domestic pressure on Saddam who noted in May 1990 that the Kuwaiti overproduction was "a kind of war against Iraq." In July 1990 he further raised the pressure accusing Kuwait and UAE of pushing a poisoned dagger into the back of Iraq. Iraq's desperate financial position had been helped in the past by loans and gifts from other Gulf states, including Kuwait, and Iraq felt Kuwait had a moral duty to repay Iraq for protecting her during the Iran- Iraq War. Access to funds was vital to reform Iraq's ailing economy and ease domestic pressure.
While turning up the level of rhetoric against his neighbours, Saddam also began to deploy large numbers of troops to the Kuwaiti border, attempting to intimidate Kuwait into helping him financially. This build up was regarded by many as simple sabre rattling and the thought of one Arab attacking another Arab nation was unthinkable in the Middle East. The then American ambassador spelt out the United States view to Iraq, April Glaspie when she allegedly informed Saddam on 25 July 1990 that the United States had "no opinion on Arab - Arab conflicts, like your border dispute with Kuwait".
