Moral luck presents a problem in which our intuition and actions are in disagreement. Nagel states the intuition "that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for what is due to factors beyond their control." (p. 99) the moral luck problem arises where part of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet he is treated as "an object of moral judgment". (p. 100) Moral luck implies that the above intuition of morality is incorrect, after all, how can an event be given moral weight if its causes are beyond the agent's control. Despite this intuition, moral worthiness is often decided despite factors out of the agent's control. For instance, a man who kills another man from driving recklessly is subject to more punishment than a man who drives recklessly without harming another man, even thought the only difference is that the first man happened drive down a street where a pedestrian happened to be crossing the road. Thus the problem of moral luck arises, the question of whether the intuition that luck must have no bearing on moral worth, and that luck plays a critical role in determining a person's moral standing. There is an obvious paradox, as a person's moral standing cannot both be partly determined by luck, and not be affected by luck.
Nagel talks about the problem of moral luck as about moral responsibility and about blame. He asks both whether the driver is morally responsible and to blame for killing someone. These questions seem intrinsically connected, that is it follows logically that if someone is morally responsible they are to blame for some event. Anyhow, the fact that luck may make a moral difference challenges our intuition. Nonetheless, luck seems to enter our moral judgments all the time. The driver is held morally responsible for the death of the pedestrian, and is thus subject to punishment. The problem Nagel points out, however, is that "Ultimately, nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control.
