Canadian naval capabilities have been under much debate recently. The role for Canada's navy has changed with the new threats of the turning millennium. Today the world role for Canada's navy has shifted focus with national navies around the world. Armaments and new warship designs have changed as well as technology inherent for "battlespace" dominance. "Battlespace" dominance is often referred to as having and maintaining superior capabilities concerning the OODA-Loop. This drive has capitulated global naval warship design of the 21st century. In this essay, a focus will be maintained on Canadian naval warfare, its path throughout recent history, and its future direction for the years to come. Analysis of recent naval publications like "Leadmark 2020" and several other commentaries on Canadian naval capabilities, from the perspective of the Canadian naval brass, this essay will argue whether or not the Canadian navy is seeing a trend towards a more technically capable fleet to compete with the changing nature of naval warfare as we see in today's world. Important documents such as the "1994 White Paper on Defense", "Leadmark 2020-The Navy's Strategy For The Year 2020" will be discussed, which define the present and future capability, organization, strategy, doctrine, and technology of the Canadian Navy. The essay will also discuss the effect of how closely related nation states tend to migrate together into RMA's, as discussed here, concerning the Canadian - American naval interoperability. This paper will address these topics to determine whether or not the policies defined in these documents mentioned here are congruent with the present procurement direction of the Canadian Navy. This paper will also discuss whether or not the Canadian Navy has commenced its very own RMA, or has Canada's technological, organizational and doctrinal shift been a mere product of our nation's close involvement and desire for interoperability with our neighbors to the south.
