Balkanization seems to be a well-deserved synonym for strife. A long history of belligerent actions, territorial disputes and treaty breechings helped apply the balkanization label. Yugoslavia after Tito's death acted in the tradition of the aforementioned word. Well before the communism lost its grip on the SE European states ethnic dispute already rose in Yugoslavia. All the ethnic groups comprised in the federation started acting nationalistically, proving that "Brotherhood and Unity" was sometimes only communist propaganda. The democratization and the freedom of speech, together with all the strains a transitional economy puts on the citizen brought Yugoslavia's demise. As the situation grew worse in what is now known as former Yugoslavia the West failed to come up with coherent or at least remotely useful policy. .
The American failure of drafting and implementing a coherent policy was only normal considering the circumstances. Mr. Bush's declaration "we have no dog in that fight" can explain why the American policy-makers failed to give more importance to the crisis than to their own rhetoric. The American public was sensitive to ethnic conflicts, and its attention was already on Yugoslavia, due to Kossovo tensions. The JNA attack on a secessionist state would have resembled too much an ethnic conflict. The policy of the US is clearly resumed in the following citation: " support for Yugoslav unity: yes; use of force to preserve that unity: no; [ ] support for self-determination: yes; unilateral declarations of independence should negotiations fail: no." As a conclusion the Administration had to choose between the political imperatives of a state that was no longer strategically important and domestic opinions. If the stakes are high the American government did not prove to be squeamish about the side they support. On the other hand, the stakes weren't high enough in this case.