Equality, Responsibility, and the Law.
In this book Arthur Ripstein justifies the content of tort and criminal law on the strength of the view that such content reflects what fair terms of interaction require in the way of allocating instances of misfortune in criminal and civil disputes. The book also examines responsibility and luck as there issues arise in tort law, criminal law, and distributive justice. In revealing how the problems that arise in tort and criminal law as well as distributive justice. In revealing how the problems that arise in tort and criminal law as well as distributive justice invite structurally parallel solutions, the author also shows the deep connection between individual responsibility and social equality. Ripstein theory attempts to show how fair terms of interaction take equality, responsibility, and reciprocity into account in allocating misfortunes and how tort and criminal law defines such terms. One of the central claims of the book is that individual responsibility and social equality need to be understood together. In the first part of the book, Ripstein considers the issue of how to allocate misfortunes that arise when parties fail to exercise appropriate care. Chapter 2 examines two libertarian approaches. Ripstein rejects the voluntarism view that any loss not resulting from intentional force or fraud should be left with the plaintiff because this view allows "each person unilaterally set the terms of interaction with others." For whether a person is liable for a loss depends on what she knows and intended with respect to her behavior. Ripstein rejects the casuals view that losses should be allocated to whomever is causally responsible because both parties to a negligence dispute are always causally responsible; had the plaintiff stayed home, she wouldn't have slipped on a banana pee; carelessly left on the floor by the defendant.