eight other smaller vessels. With some of the invading forces'.
ships destroyed, and no command and control ship, the logistics of.
the operation soon broke down as the other supply ships were kept.
at bay by Casto's air force. As with many failed military.
adventures, one of the problems with this one was with supplying.
the troops.
In the air, Castro had easily won superiority over the.
invading force. His fast moving T-33s, although unimpressive by.
today's standards, made short work of the slow moving B-26s of the.
invading force. On Tuesday, two were shot out of the sky and by.
Wednesday the invaders had lost 10 of their 12 aircraft. With.
air power firmly in control of Castro's forces, the end was near.
for the invading army.
Over the 72 hours the invading force of about 1500 men were.
pounded by the Cubans. Casto fired 122mm. Howitzers, 22mm. cannon,.
and tank fire at them. By Wednesday the invaders were pushed back.
to their landing zone at Playa Gir
•n. Surrounded by Castro's forces.
some began to surrender while others fled into the hills. In.
total 114 men were killed in the slaughter while thirty-six died as.
prisoners in Cuban cells. Others were to live out twenty years or.
more in those cells as men plotting to topple the government of.
Castro.
The 1500 men of the invading force never had a chance for.
success from almost the first days in the planning stage of the.
operation. Operation Pluto, as it came to be known as, has its.
origins in the last dying days of the Eisenhower administration and.
that murky time period during the transition of power to the newly.
elected president John F. Kennedy.
The origins of American policy in Latin America in the late.
1950s and early 1960s has its origins in American's economic.
interests and its anticommunist policies in the region. The same.
man who had helped formulate American containment policy towards.
the Soviet threat, George Kennan, in 1950 spoke to US Chiefs of.