The Peloponnesian wars have been called a template for all wars. This series of conflicts between Athens and Sparta shows textbook examples of key facets of war, including battles of unified vs. divided interests, battles of land powers vs. sea powers, and the importance controlling prime strategic real estate (be it land or sea). As we will see, this description of the Peloponnesian wars as a template for future wars holds strikingly true for the series of conflicts between Napoleon's France and the coalitions formed from the scattered European powers at the beginning of the nineteenth century. .
We will begin, as all wars do, with net assessments and social structures. Athens internal system is one of public forum and debate, this tends to make the majority happy, but slows decision making. Analogously, the Coalitions are made of many nations each with their own agenda, each hoping to achieve it through the defeat of Napoleon. Sparta was point ruled by a king, namely, Archedamus while Napoleon was similarly authoritative in his chain of command, believing that "one bad general is better than two good ones". These social intricacies carry great weight, as it is true that in any conflict, shared interests and loyalty to a common cause are two of the most important weapons. At the time of Pericles' Mergarian Decree, the Athenian empire was a tightly bound system of tribute-paying cosmopolitan states, all sharing similar cultures, economic and political systems, etc. Most importantly, the Athenian Empire began as a unified military power against a Spartan army comprised more of untrustworthy helot slaves than of actual Spartan citizens or Spariate military elite. The end result of this was that most of those who fought under Pericles' Athens did so willingly while many of those who fought for Archidamus' Sparta did so by force, and may have been more interested in their own well being than in Sparta's interest as a power.