Though this is chiefly remembered because of Chamberlain's attitude towards Germany and Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938, the general trend of trying to reduce the international consequences of small disputes and maintain the peaceful balance was evident in Eden's policy towards Spain in August 1936. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia and in March 1936, the German militarization of the Rhineland were certainly of significance to the Foreign Office since both these right wing Nationalist governments were sympathetic towards Franco, so heavy British intervention on behalf of the Republic could lead to a broader crisis. Despite the fact that neither Hitler nor Mussolini were yet capable of fighting a European war the perception was that Britain's unreadiness meant that she could not risk a widening of the conflict. At the same time she did not want to abandon the Republic to the mercy of the Germans or Italians so an attempt at multilateral non-intervention was the preferred policy.
`It also has to be noted that in August 1936, Spain was not the chief priority of the British Government. The Foreign Office was in the process of trying to arrange a redrafting of the 1925 Locarno Pact and was aiming to get the main powers together to reassert the balance of power. The Spanish Civil War, as it escalated and as Italy, Germany and the USSR flagrantly violated the Non-Intervention agreement of 15th August, contributed to the failure of such an agreement, which is partly a testament to the weakness of the appeasement policy. As Adams says of the Non-Intervention agreement: "All attending piously condemned intervention but resisted the creation of any effective means of preventing it." (1) But when the conflict broke out it was perceived as only a minor concern and not worth risking the long term peace of Europe over.
`Within Britain there were mixed opinions as to what the policy in Spain should be.