After the Soviets detonated its own bomb in September 1949, the Truman administration abandoned its policy of natural deterrence and ordered the development of more powerful hydrogen thermonuclear bomb. Since Soviet nuclear bombs deterred US deterrence, Truman sought a way to restore deterrence. He ordered a study by the Department of State's policy planning staff and the result, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PAPER 68 (NSC-68), went to Truman in April 1950. It recommended that conventional forces at home and in West Europe should be dramatically increased. The loss of nuclear deterrence meant that conventional forces hat to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. However, in 1952 John Foster Duller argued in an article "A policy of Boldness" that the deterrence could work without using large and expensive conventional armies. The Soviets should believe that USA has capability do inflict horrible devastation in retaliation. Therefore, Eisenhower named Dulles the secretary of state in 1952 and accepted his nuclear strategy. Eisenhower ordered rapid increase in the production of nuclear weapons and airplanes capable to deliver them. This was called "more bang for the buck." The deterrence was enhanced and less conventional forces in Europe reduced the threat of military attack by the West upon the Soviet Union. It was the best way to prevent WW 3.
At this point, more important than weapons became a coalition of countries that agree to protect each other or to attack some enemy. Both major powers realized that the possession of nuclear weapons endowed them with alliance building capabilities. The major nuclear powers could offer protection. No nuclear states would fit under one or the other's "nuclear umbrella." The Soviet Union organized its East European satellites into Warsaw Pact in 1955. In addition to NATO, USA established security treaties with Japan in 1951,Australiacc, and New Zealand (ANZUS) in 1951, and with Southeast Asian states (SEATO) in 1954.