This new mandate constituted a radical change of emphasis and direction from the Wray.
and Rothman approaches. McLachlin J. put it this way in R. v. Hebert: .
The Charter introduced a marked change in philosophy with respect to the.
reception of improperly or illegally obtained evidence. Section 24(2).
stipulates that evidence obtained in violation of rights may be excluded if.
it would tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute,.
3.
6 R. v. Strachan, 46 C.C.C. (3d) 479, 67 C.R. (3d) 87, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 per Dickson C.J.C. and R. v. Grant, [1993] 3.
S.C.R. 223, per Sopinka J. at p. 256. However, exclusion is virtually automatic in the case of undiscoverable.
conscriptive evidence.
7 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). "Next-to-automatic" because.
in United States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897 (1984) and Mass. v. Sheppard 468 U.S. 981 (1984) the Supreme Court of the.
United States recognized a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
8 (1989), 45 C.C.C. (3d) 296 at p. 323, 66 C.R. (3d) 297 at p. 324, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 at p. 523.
regardless of how probative it may be. No longer is reliability determinative. The Charter has made the rights of the individual and the fairness and integrity of the judicial system paramount. The logic upon which Wray was based, and which led the majority in Rothman to conclude that a confession obtained by a police trick could not be.
excluded, finds no place in the Charter. To say there is no discretion to exclude a statement on grounds of unfairness to the suspect and the integrity of the judicial system, as did the majority in Rothman, runs counter to the fundamental philosophy of the Charter. This new philosophy has effectively opened another avenue of defence, as a result applications for the exclusion of evidence have become commonplace in Canadian criminal proceedings. Indeed, in many cases the crucial battle of the case is fought on the s-s. 24(2) application.