Nevertheless, Joll points out that domestic policies played a part, but not a big one as to lead to war. Ultimately, politicians did not "deliberately embarked on war as a way out of their insoluble domestic, social and political problems." Economic rivalries were another factor that Joll examined. He indicated that "not all imperialistic policies were inspired by direct economic interests." Although economic interest had often lead to strategic frictions between the Great Powers, in the end "economic interests were not too much [ ] in the minds of the politicians" in July 1914. To minimize the role of economic calculations vis -vis a war, Joll indicated that the opponents had not "taken into account the economic consequences and needs of a war." Governments thus did not embark on war in order to satisfy private or budgetary financial interests. Regarding Imperialism, Joll pointed out that, although it did increase in pace between 1880 and 1900, it was not the immediate cause for war. Britain had an Empire to defend; Russia was pushing in the Middle East and was already present in Persia; Italy wanted to live up to its glorious past and Germany wanted to create its own sea power, or Weltpolitik. Yet, despite obvious opposing aims, the Great Powers were able to expand while preserving peace. Joll thus mentions all the various treaties that the Great Powers signed in the 19th C. and early 20th C. The only agreement that was not achieved, the Anglo-German one, was still not enough to spark the war. An agreement would have been achieved if "the Germans had been prepared to abate their claims to naval hegemony and world power." Joll thus concludes that "imperialist policies had contributed to the frame of mind in which decisions were taken" , but the war itself was not caused by "immediate imperialist activities". The immediate cause, according to Joll, was to be found in the attitudes of 1914.