There can be no argument that Wal*Mart has revolutionized the discount retailing industry. Furthermore, CEO Glass and COO Soderquist have stepped in at the helm of this company and continued to take it in the right direction by quadrupling sales and profits from 1987 to 1993. The main problem they now face is how to sustain their phenomenal performance and becoming number one has magnified this issue. No longer can they just sneak into small towns where the only competition is the local merchant's shop. No longer can they copy larger companies like Sears and J.C. Penny's because of their size and scope. The fact is, Wal*Mart is bigger than these companies and their direct competitors Kmart and Target are doing everything in their power to close that gap. They are lurking not so quietly in the shadows, benefiting from Wal*Mart's past choices, successes, and failures. They are there to blow the whistle if Wal*Mart steps outside the lines. Wal*Mart may be growing, but at a rate under 10% for the first time in years. Shareholders are concerned, the press is relentless, and many obstacles lie in their path if they hope to continue the trends Sam Walton set so ambitiously in 1962. These are some of the issues that I will be discussing throughout this paper.
Industry Analysis.
With one of their main issues being sustained profitability, Wal*Mart is at a critical time in their life. They are no longer the hero, a place commonly reserved for competitors striving to be number one, because Wal*Mart is number one. No one can debate how effective they have been in getting here. Through their focus on superior technology and low cost leadership, Wal*Mart reigned supreme. Wal*Mart is classified as a discount store that sells general merchandise by charging gross margins of 10-15% lower than those of conventional department stores. To compensate, discount stores cut costs to the bone: fixtures were distinctly unluxurious, in-store selling was limited, and ancillary services, such as delivery, and credit, were scarce.