Between 1960 and 1970 Spain experienced a level of industrial development and growth which was second to none in Europe. All economic indicators showed remarkable annual percentage increases (Industrial sector +15% pa; G.N.P., real wages, productivity +7% pa) (Maravall and Santamaria: 74).
Combined with this rapid industrialisation there was also a fundamental demographic shift away from rural Spain as more Spaniards moved into the large industrial towns, greatly increasing the size of the industrial proletariat. By 1965, the uninterrupted growth of the economy, and of the prosperity it provided reduced the regime's repressive capabilities as it increasingly came to realise that economic growth could only be maintained with the goodwill of the new industrial classes - particularly the new urban middle classes.
The fundamental changes in the economic circumstances engendered equally fundamental changes in the social structure. Increasing prosperity brought with it rising expectations and industrial unrest; between 1966 and 1970 the total hours lost in strikes (which were still illegal) had increased by 480% (Maraval and Santamaria: 77), furthermore, these strike were increasingly taking on a political as well as an economic complexion.
These tensions were mirrored within the regime itself in the shape of a conflict between the 'liberalising' Opus Dei technocrats, who wished to see continuing economic development, and the 'fundamentalist' Falange, who recognised the dangers of modernisation. By 1969, with the uncovering of a financial scandal implicating members of Opus Dei, the Falange emerged victorious. The new cabinet, headed by Carrero Blanco, began a programme of repression and instigated a state of emergency. Thus reversal of the liberalisation of the 1960s, however, only fuelled the discontent and narrowed the regime's already fragile support base, both internally and externally, with both the church and the bureaucracy withdrawing their support.