Thus Secretary John Foster Dulles & Secretary Carlos Romulo could state in a joint note in 1954 that an armed that "an attack on the Philippines could not but also be an attack upon the military forces of the US." But even during all those intimate years, transcending the transient intimacies in Subic or Angeles bars, we could never get a clear statement from the US as to when & where the attack on one party should be regarded as an attack on the other, & what manner of retaliation could be rightfully expected. .
That was not unexpected in the Philippines & the US, there were & are constitutional obstacles for any executive to give a clear assurance external military involvement. External military involvement requires men & materiel over which the executive department which forges foreign relations has no control. The matter of attack on Philippine territory is further complicated by the absence of global acceptance of what we claim as Philippine territory. .
QUESTION OF ACCESS.
The concept can be taken to mean "commercial access." If what this involves is merely allowing the US & other foreign military vessels to enter Philippine territory for either repairs of refueling, the constitutional issue is one that can arise from the nuclear arms provision of the Constitution. If for instance, the US would insist on a policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear arms in military vessels, then an attempt to come in under such condition would be an affront against the constitutional duty of the Philippine government to keep the territory free from nuclear arms. .
Access can also mean "training access" or "joint exercise access." As long as what is contemplated does not involve allowing the stay of a foreign military personnel with any degree of permanence beyond what is reasonably required for transitory training or joint exercise & as long as nuclear arms are excluded, issues of constitutionality need not come in.