As the bi-polar world collapsed with the fall of the Soviet Union, the U. emerged confused and unclear of how to operate in an environment largely malleable to its hegemonic will. Ambiguity and lack of a clear mission suddenly replaced the ideological clarity the Red threat had provided for foreign policy makers in the cold-war era. Rather than reassessing the security environment within the radically new framework it required, in the face of uncertainty, Washington fell back on what was familiar. With globalization continually bringing the human community into greater contact and superceding state boundaries, the security paradigm nonetheless remained focused on the traditional inter-state and great power conflict. .
History weighed heavy in the minds of pundits in this new analysis, seeing as power is inevitably brought into balance and ultimately upset; all empires eventually collapse. Policy in this period under both Bush and Clinton largely reflected these fears, pursuing the status quo whenever possible. With a few notable exceptions, the goal was to avoid directly threatening existing regimes, preventing them from balancing against such a threat. In the presence of an overwhelming military and economic dominance, no state would dare challenge or balance against the U.S., especially if they faced no provocation. (No threat to balance against as opposed to pure balance of power theory. Site Walt(?) for evidence). However, the status quo mentality provided little incentive for long-term bandwagoning either. Allies could be easily bought in short-term, convenient circumstances, but a deeper allegiance to American ideology, values and presence in the global arena was rarely established. Compounding the problem was an overwhelming inattentiveness to the human community at the sub-state and individual level.
Throughout the 1990's and the onset of the new millennium, this pragmatic policy took on different shapes with each coming administration, but the basic tenants remained largely the same.