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Abortion and the Nature of Human Life

 

" Professor Judith Thomson offers an analogy concluding the interdependency of fetuses to their mother, as the relationship of the fetus is contingent on the health of the mother. Is abortion then suitable? .
             In the case of rape, wherein a woman is effectively impregnated against her will, the mother is then unwillingly pregnant and therefore, nothing obligates her to make the "enormous sacrifice which is necessary to preserve the conceptus[Warren]." Of course, this pretense assumes that fetuses possess life, which Warren reasons untrue, and those fetuses are "considerably less person-like than is the average mature mammal [Gazzaniga]" given their mental capacity, or lack thereof. On the other hand, Simpson's argument resounds in its repulse for abortion, as he draws upon the effects of abortion and what it means to possess life. Simpson's argument initiates in his refutation of the claim that fetuses are simply "collection[s] of cells lacking the fully developed structure of a human being [Simpson 2]," considering that this takes away from the concept of life. In this circumstance, is life not the presence of fetal activity instead of being "physically complete [Simpson 7]?" Life is not what we recognize as the natures of things, nor is it the "outward appearance of its shape, nor its other visible characteristics [Simpson 7]." .
             Moreover, Simpson's analogy between the condition of the comatose and the unborn holds a strong point; if one considers a comatose state living, the removal of life support indicates premeditated murder; if a fetus is on "life support" by being attached to its parent, is abortion no different than removing life support form the comatose? Simpson continues, "zygote[s] are the immediate stage after conception and the 1st stage of the unborn in the womb [Simpson 4]." It is then absurd to say that .


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