S. policy in Vietnam and to search for other solutions to the problem. (19) In August 1964, President Johnson dispatched the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to Congress. After two American destroyers were attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats, Johnson did not allow Congress to pass a resolution to this specific problem. (22) This caused Fulbright to believe that Johnson had lied to him about the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. However, the president felt that Fulbright deserted him and left the party. (51) Johnson remarked, "I don't want to back out-and look like I'm reacting to the Fulbrights." (52) He believed that Fulbright and other antiwar senators had become victims of the enemy. The president also stated that no "real program" had been "presented that offers a clear alternative to what we are doing." (53) .
The hearings gained more national attention when two White House representatives, Maxwell Taylor and Dean Rusk, appeared on February 17 and 18. Maxwell D. Taylor was serving as Johnson's special consultant on Vietnam. Taylor had come to the SFRC via the U.S. army. He was a strong supporter of the need to use aggressive military tactics to Vietnam. (55) Taylor argued that the North Vietnamese had won more from the French with peace than on the battlefield. He stated Vietnam wanted to repeat that scenario with the United States. Taylor also believed if the United States were to withdraw from the war, it would be "badly misguided" and fail to "understand the consequences of such a disaster." Wayne Morse's comeback was implying that Taylor and the President have been "misguiding" them for a long time in this war. (58) During Rusk's testimony, Taylor mentioned that he "underestimated the tenacity of North Vietnam." (58) Rusk viewed the conflict as still part of the cold war. This did not allow Rusk to view the war from a neutral perspective.