.
Furthermore, even though the Truman Doctrine was the first instance whereby there was a public declaration that the US would stand up against the Soviet expansionism, the underlying perception that it was no longer able to compromise with the Soviets was already expressed privately by the American leader and policy makers prior to 1947. As early as January 1946, Truman had already made up his mind to 'stop babying the Soviets' as part of his New Year's Resolution in view of the sovietization of Romania and Bulgaria. This perception was also present in policy makers as seen from the Kennan's Long Telegram which was circulated in the Truman administration a month later. In fact, American perceptions towards the Soviets might have changed as early as the post-Yalta Conference period in April 1945 when even Roosevelt, a perennial optimist, expressed his doubts about cooperating with Stalin. Hence, the Truman Doctrine was merely an articulation of the American policy and intentions expressed and declared in the open. .
The importance of the Truman Doctrine is further limited when considering the fact that this public declaration was presented in such a way that indicated Truman's reluctance to directly confront or provoke the Soviets. The fact that Truman made no mention of the terms 'Soviets' and 'communism' in his address and used the term 'totalitarian regimes' to allude to Soviet underlines highlighted that he was not ready to confront the Soviets in March 1947. This might also explain why there was no immediate response from the Soviets and hence no change in US-Soviet relations. In contrast, the conditions of economic coordination attached to the Marshall Plan of June 1947 were clearly designed to elicit Soviet response. Hence, the Truman Doctrine lacks significance as the cause of Cold War as it highlighted a point in history whereby Truman was still not willing to break ties with the Soviet Union and get involved in a direct confrontation.