NSC 68 focused heavily on the ideological differences of the superpowers and the threat posed to America, mentioning the term 'freedom' frequently as this would become not just the public front of the Korean War to the American people, but to all people via the U.N. – a war of ideology, of freedom vs. slavery or oppression. Therefore, the question of Korea being a threat to world security changes because America as 'the principle centre of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion' became representative of world security, and therefore what America were involved with, or deem to be a threat to their own national security meant the world would be encompassed too. An example of this would be from the British cabinet meeting on 31st August 1950 when the goals of the United Nations are clearly defined in line with American foreign policy – the threat of Communism to an 'immature' nation and need to establish a western styled government being the key example. In addition, this remained the case throughout the conflict as the 'reunification of the Korean peninsula' was considered by the U.N. to not be worthy of a prolonged conflict, something shared by Truman and as stated for his reason for dismissing General Douglas Macarthur (because his actions did not concur). Robert Donovan agrees with this hypothesis of American policy, and furthers it by suggesting that this extension of the American sphere of influence meant that the North Korean progression over the 38th parallel was inevitably going to be interpreted in Washington as a profound challenge to American interests. .
Overall, the threat to global security became the public reason for American involvement in Korea because it enabled the U.S. to create a positive portrayal of themselves in the world arena as the foremost superpower in ascendancy, and therefore the best superpower for smaller nations to seek allegiance with.