Regional trade agreements have become popular since the 1990s, and FTAs have been actively promoted in regional or bilateral level. Both readings explain the reason for the shift from multilateralism to regional and bilateral forums but from different perspectives. Pekkanen's view is that states have the trade-off between gain and control. FTAs would be easy to realize controls over rules though generate fewer gains. Yoshimatsu takes into account the influence and involvement of societal groups like the Keidanren in FTA formation. .
In my reaction paper, I would argue that the "trading gains for control" may explain, to some extent, the FTA behavior, but "control" in trade negotiation ultimately serve for specific economic gains. In addition, the control in trade forums is guided by the opinions from societal groups, who play important roles in the formation of FTAs, and their involvement bridges interests of domestic producers and the actual negotiation in FTAs. First, the needs for control in gain-control tradeoff ultimately serve for gains of domestic sectors. Pekkanan defined gain in his paper as the total national economic welfare; and control as the extent to which the states can influence and manipulate the pace and scope of liberalization. However, I could not see the two as opposite sides of a tradeoff. In terms of gains, multilateral forums in theory do maximize the total welfare of states, which consists of the consumer and producer's welfare. But in reality, consumer's welfare is often ignored and most of the attention is paid to assure the producer's welfare. Therefore, the control motivation in FTAs, that is to maximize interests of competitive sector and protect uncompetitive sector, serve exactly to ensure the producer's welfare. In addition, Pekkanan mentions the small export share from FTA to support his control argument, but he does not mention the tariff structure between FTA and non-FTA partners, let alone the disadvantageous position in those markets if without FTAs.