A second group whom the British had alienated was the regional elites who had recently lost their thrones and pensions with Governor-General Dalhousie's 'Doctrine of Lapse' annexation policy. That the Mutiny became a personal restoration campaign for figures like Nana Sahib, Devi Singh and Lakshmibai can be seen from the fact that each figures led protracted campaigns, long after the fall of Delhi, which were based primarily on their own leadership. The social unrest occasioned by the rebellion was also used by local political figures for their own rivalries, as well as by criminals (labelled badmashi by the British) who profited from the upsurge in violence and looting. .
However, if the rebellion appealed strongly to some groups, other sections of Indian society were more ambivalent about it. Most importantly, despite rumours in British primary sources of plots in the Bombay and Madras armies, neither of the other two presidential armies mutinied. In the Punjab, Sir John Lawrence was also able to preempt major trouble through forced disarmament and exemplary punishment for conspirators. Outside of the military, the British had created powerful allies, such as the Jagat Seth banking family in Calcutta and the Nizam of Hyderabad, who had benefitted financially and politically from their presence and who even funded some British counterinsurgency operations. Finally, and revealingly, civilians, particularly in Delhi, had a complicated relationship with the mutineers, with the former primarily occupied with the safety and security of their families and property. The uncertainty of the future may have led some civilians to wait before committing to one side, while the fear of British reprisals was both persistent and well warranted. Thus, from the reactions of the groups above, it can be seen that a major factor in the failure of the rebellion was its confinement to north and central India and its appeal to significant, but limited, social groups.